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How Natural are National and Transnational
Citizenship? A Historical Perspective
DAVID THELEN°
The aspiration to be a "citizen of the world" reaches far back before
MarthaNussbaum's proclamation, before even Thomas Paine's and William
Lloyd Garrison's, back at least to Socrates, if we can believe Plutarch. At a
time when there is so much talk about globalization, Linda Bosniak has written
an important article that reviews writings on citizenship to explore what
"denationalized" citizenship looks like in the present and might look like in the
future. My goal in this Comment is to evaluate Bosniak's observations from
a historian's point of view.
This challenge is difficult because history is probably the most nation-
centered discipline. The modem discipline of history took shape in the early
nineteenth century around the promotion of the nation-State as the core identity
that the new "scientific" historians wanted people to embrace. Nations, the
first modem historians proclaimed, were the best vehicles through which
people could fulfill their dreams and destinies. The sources left by nation-
States generated the most important traces for these nation-minded historians
to collect, preserve, and study because the past of the nation-State contained
the lessons that most interested the new historians. As the nineteenth century
wore on, romantic nationalism and emergence of national professional
practices reinforced history's embrace of the nation-State. By the 1890s,
historians added a pedagogical and civicjustification when they centered their
claims for public support on the mission ofteaching national citizenship. It was
in the 1890s that "history definitely came into its own as the primary medium
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CITIZENS IN THE AGE OF TELEVISION (1996). He has recently organized projects and written on the
development of transnational perspectives on American History, reflected in the March, 1999,
September, 1999, and December, 1999 special issues of THEJOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY,
which he edited from 1985 to 1999. His other recent interest centers on how people understand
and use the past as they try to shape their lives, an interest reflected in THE PRESENCE OF THE
PAST: POPULAR USES OF HISTORY IN AMERICAN LIFE (1998), co-authored with Roy Rosenzweig.
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 7:549
for civic education."' Historians developed academic courses with national
citizenship at the core ofa chronological record of events, held together by the
single theme that all the events happened in the same nation-State. While
historians ofthe past generation have certainly widened the topics and voices
they have looked for in the past-and indeed Karl Marx long ago took the
"workers of the world" as his subject-historians have found it very hard to
"rescue history from the nation," or, as Prasenjit Duara has put the challenge:
"even the best social historians do not find themselves challenging the
assumption that the nation is the master subject of history or theorizing an
alternative to the already-always nation space is testimony to the complicity of
history and the nation state."2 It is hard, therefore, for historians to separate
claims for the nation-State from themes like citizenship that historians have
embedded in the nation-State. This Comment argues, however, that national
citizenship has been a difficult project for most of the history of the United
States, and that recent developments in where and how Americans have
experienced citizenship have made it at least as "natural" to imagine
transnational patterns of citizenship as it has been, in the past, to legitimate
national patterns.
Bosniak begins to suggest how history might illuminate the prospect of a
denationalized conception of citizenship. She asks us to look critically at the
fundamental assumption that"thinking of citizenship in national terms is part
of our political common sense." 3  She urges us to unpack "various
understandings we maintain of the concept of citizenship,"4 including the
diverse meanings and experiences it conveys in the present. By extending her
perspective to include earlier contests and negotiations over citizenship, I widen
our sense of the stakes in citizenship, and question the "common sense" faith
that it is somehow natural to think of citizenship in national, instead of some
other, terms. This Comment underscores the contested and unstable history
of citizenship, at least in the United States, not only to counter the tendency to
speak in terms of abstract models, but even more to suggest how some of the
conflicts from the past help us to imagine the directions citizenship may take
1. ROBERT WENDELL FREDERICK & PAUL H. SHEATS, CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION THROUGH THE
SOCIAL STUDIES: A PHILOSOPHY AND A PROGRAM 18 (1936).
2. PRASENJIT DUARA, RESCUING HISTORY FROM THE NATION: QUESTIONING NARRATIVES OF
MODERN CHINA 28 (1995); see also Prasenjit Duara, The Regime of Authenticity: Timelessness,
Gender, and National History in Modern China, 37 HIST. AND THEORY 287 (1998).
3. Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 449
(2000).
4. Id at 452.
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in the future-as well as the obstacles it may encounter. From this perspective,
neither the "national" nor the "citizenship" halfof"national citizenship" looks
very natural.
The most common narrative for citizenship, at least in the United States,
is the story of its contested extension to various new groups of people, which
both led toward and resulted from the broadening of popular empowerment.
It is the story of struggles by groups to acquire what are presented as the
"blessings" of citizenship, struggles that have resulted in extending those
blessings to poor white men, black men, immigrants, Native Americans,
women, and eighteen-year-olds. But this history has been neither inevitable
nor linear. Black men won the right to vote, then lost it, and then regained it
in different places in struggles that stretched across a century. Chinese
immigrants were specifically prohibited from entering the United States and
from becoming U.S. citizens from 1882 until well into the twentieth century.
Women acquired the right to vote in many school board elections two
generations before they acquired the right to vote in most state and national
elections.
Not only did citizenship mean different things to different groups at
different times, but, it also meant different things at the same time in different
places, as cities and states sought to change the composition of local
electorates by depriving people who qualified for national citizenship of the
right to vote in their communities. In Texas, the state poll tax of 1903 cut, in
a single stroke, the proportion of poor citizens in the eligible electorate from
seventy-six percent to thirty-two percent. As a result of such interventions, in
the presidential election of 1940, eighty-three percent of adult citizens actually
voted in West Virginia and Illinois while only fifteen percent voted in
Mississippi and ten percent in South Carolina.6
The acquisition and exercise of national citizenship are anything but
"common sense" to people at the times and places they occur. Not only have
different people sought voting rights at different times, but even when they
have been eligible to vote, voting has seemed more attractive to some voters
than to others. In 1996, for example, as political issues and the aims of
government became increasingly shaped by wealthy campaign contributors,
5. JOHN S. WISE, A TREATISE ON AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 275 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1980)
(1905); see also FREDERICK VAN DYNE, CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES 57 (1904).
6. DUDLEY 0. McGOVNEY, THE AMERICAN SUFFRAGE MEDLEY: THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL"
UNIFORM SUFFRAGE 81 (1949); Harold L. Platt, City-Building and Progressive Reform: The
Modernization of an Urban Polity, Houston, 1892-1905,in THE AGE OF URBAN REFORM: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 41 (Michael H. Ebner & Euguene M. Tobin eds., 1977).
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voters in families that earned over $75,000 were three times more likely to vote
for the president of the United States than those in families making less than
$25,000. Citizens with college degrees were twice as likely to vote as those
who failed to complete high school.7 Victories in a particular group's claims
for inclusion have come less because of the naturalness or justice of the
group's cause, than because of the fact that those managing wars, both hot
and cold, needed to be able to silence a group's cries of exclusion as those
leaders have wanted to make democracy one of their war aims. To make
democracy a meaningful war aim, the State extended citizenship to blacks in
the Civil War (and later World War II and the Cold War), women in World
War I, and 18-year-olds in the Vietnam War.
But there are other, darker narratives of struggles over citizenship that
center not on acquisition and exercise of rights, but on the imposition and
exercise of responsibilities-on obedience, not empowerment. "It may be an
easy thing to make a Republic," began Horace Mann in promoting the project
of universal public education, "but it is a very laborious thing to make
Republicans; and woe to the republic that rests upon no better foundations than
ignorance, selfishness, and passion."8 From the start, promoters of republican
government feared how people would exercise their rights ofcitizenship. The
history of citizenship is the history of fears, by those with political or cultural
power, ofthe irrationality, demagoguery, escapism, radicalism, irresponsibility,
envy, and selfishness that their inferiors might exercise. They have often
brought these fears to the surface when they saw the United States struggling
with governments that seemed better able to control and manage their citizens,
such as monarchies in the eighteenth century or communism and fascism in the
twentieth century. This narrative forms a major, perhaps the major, theme in
much of the writing about "citizenship" and "civics." The sheer volume of
committees, plans, and reports on this theme points to how unstable, insecure,
and wide-ranging the hopes are for good citizenship and fears of bad
citizenship, or the fears of containing the excesses of democracy once they are
unleashed. In these endless writings and preachings, the issue is not whether
people will become citizens, but whether they will be "good" or "bad" citizens
as defined by those in power.
From this perspective, the story of citizenship is not the story of the
desirability or naturalness of citizenship, but ofherculean struggles-indeed at
7. CHI. TRI., Jan. 30,2000, at 1,4.
8. Horace Mann, Twelfth Annual Report, in THE REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL: HORACE
MANN ON THE EDUCATION OF FREE MEN 92 (Lawrence A. Cremin ed., 1957).
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times obsessions-to channel how citizens exercise their rights. It is a narrative
in which people have resisted, not embraced, "citizenship" which centralizers
and homogenizers have tried to impose over the traditional ways that people
have tried to control their lives. It is a struggle against the whole thrust of
national citizenship.
Fearing how citizens would use their rights, U.S. leaders mobilized massive
agencies to persuade these same citizens to channel citizenship within
acceptable limits. From the adoption of universal suffrage for white men in the
first third ofthe nineteenth century and the accompanying rise of"Jacksonian
Democracy," elites from Horace Mann onward promoted public schools as
crucial agencies for teaching citizens to channel their aspirations and behavior
within a range of constraints that school officials by the twentieth century,
would conflate into "good citizenship." From his positions as superintendent
ofthe St. Louis schools9 and first U.S. Commissioner of Education, ° William
Torrey Harris articulated the public schools' mission to create, not empowered
individuals, but obedient ones. With the rise of new factories, themselves
breeding grounds of popular resistance, Harris blended the missions ofteaching
the public obedience to political authorities, and teaching them obedience to
factory owners. The issue in the exercise of rights, he explained, was
discipline (or in Victorian terms, self-control) not self-fulfillment or
empowerment. Asserted Harris:
The discipline of our Public Schools, wherein punctuality and
regularity are enforced and the pupils are continually taught
to suppress mere self-will and inclination, is the best school of
morality.... [T]he reason why more stress is placed upon
discipline than upon instruction here in America is plain. In
our society and government we aim to place as few safe-
guards as possible around the individual from without, and
therefore our system of education must make the character
strong and self-determined from within."
Harris also maintained: "The utmost energy of the teacher is expended in
securing for all his pupils that formation of correct habits. Industry, punctuality,
9. From 1868-1880. DAVIDTTHELEN, PATHS OF RESISTANCE: TRADITION AND DIGNITY IN
INDUSTRIALIZING MISSOURI 109 (1986).
10. From 1889-1907. Id.
11. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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regularity, respect for the rights of others, and obedience to established
authority-these are the cardinal virtues of the schoolroom and the foundation
of [its] orders."' 2 By the 1890s, public school educators created the "good
citizenship" movement which turned schools into cities, home rooms into
wards, pupils into voters, and student councils into city councils, as pupils were
taught to exercise citizenship toward directions and along channels approved
by school administrators. For example, students might be allowed to choose
the color of crepe paper with which to decorate school dances. No sooner did
schools seem to have finally taught students to internalize one form of
regularity (e.g., punctuality or English language instruction), than school
officials would find some new arena in which pupils would reveal the dangers
of self-government. As George Coe explained: "Popular government-popular
education; these two poles are ever discernible in American educational
thought. Because the people are the ultimate source of authority, schooling is
made universal and compulsory. It is expected to fit them to perform the duty
of governing, particularly of voting."' 3
The larger challenge ofcitizenship was to teach future citizens not to make
laws but to obey the laws made by others. Worrying about what struck him
as an appalling spread of mob violence in the 1830s, Abraham Lincoln gave
classic expression to this vision of citizenship:
Let reverence of the law be breathed by every American
mother to the lisping babe that prattles on her lap. Let it be
taught in schools, in seminaries, and in colleges; let it be
written in primers, spelling books, and in almanacs; let it be
preached from the pulpit, proclaimed in legislative halls and
enforced in courts ofjustice. And in short let it become the
political religion of the nation.' 4
A hundred years later, school officials still preached Lincoln's "political
religion" as they tried to devise ways ofturning schools into alternatives to jails,
to get future citizens to appreciate the importance of obeying the law. In 1926,
H. H. Cherry wrote:
12. Id. at 109.
13. GEORGE A. COE, EDUCATING FOR CITIZENSHIP: THE SOVEREIGN STATE AS RULER AND AS
TEACHER 1, 3 (1932).
14. Abraham Lincoln, The Perpetuation of our Political Institutions: Address Before the Young
Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois (1837), in 3LIFE AND WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, at 14,
20 (Marion Mills Miller ed., 1907).
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The country is full of undesirable citizens who seem to think
they are Americans, but who are frequently in word and
conduct lawbreakers that trample law under their feet until
they reach the door of the criminal's cell and then
mechanically obey the law in order to stay out of the
penitentiary. Not more laws, but more respect for authorized
law, and more positive and efficient support in the
enforcement of laws already made, is our greatest need. This
must be accomplished largely through education) 5
Thus, uncontrolled passion and lawbreaking were evils that many school
officials and other elites placed at the center of their narratives about the
history of citizenship as they redefined self-government as self-control.
Not only was the narrative of national citizenship a record of struggle
between responsibility and obedience, on the one hand, and rights and
empowerment, on the other hand, but many conflicts erupted over whether the
national government was a legitimate (or natural) arena for Americans to
assign their primary (or even any) allegiance; whether it was the most
congenial or effective political space in which to try to control their lives.
Indeed, a major theme in any narrative of national citizenship would be the
seemingly endless resistance to national authority. It is the story of how people
have tried to preserve other identities as places for controlling their lives, in the
face of attempts by the national government to impose loyalty and obedience.
It has been a struggle from the start.
As the price for supporting any kind of national government, anti-
Federalists secured ten amendments to the new Constitution that restrained
national authority and gave power to individuals and states. Throughout the
years, Americans have also vigorously protested the financial burdens of
citizenship: from the rebels who refused to pay a whisky tax, imposed by the
new national government in the 1790s (a rebellion President George
Washington led troops to suppress); to Henry David Thoreau's influential
statement for why he would rather go to jail than pay a tax to support slavery
and the Mexican War; to the protests against Federal tax burdens and the
Internal Revenue Service in the 1990s. Nullification and secession movements
seeking to overturn national authority spread from New England in 1815 to the
15. H.H. CHERRY, EDUCATION: THE BASIS OF DEMOCRACY 92 (1926).
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Coastal South in 1833, climaxing in civil war. In addition, Unionists only
created national citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment after Southern
whites enacted "black codes" that sought to reestablish slavery within months
after the Union Army had compelled them to abolish it. Not surprisingly, the
new Reconstruction governments imposed a public school system with
teachings of obedience and costs many southern whites opposed. In the draft
riots of the 1860s, 1910s, and 1960s, many Americans tried to evade
conscription when the Federal government tried to draft them for military
service. Furthermore, the United States has among the lowest voting rates;
half of all eligible voters have not even found rights of citizenship "natural"
enough to exercise them. The story of national citizenship is the story of
attempts by Americans to control their lives at local and state levels and to hold
off the national government.
Promoters of national authority not only had to contend with citizens who
believed that some other geographic level of sovereignty was more appropriate
than the national level, but also with people who felt stronger cultural, linguistic,
or emotional connections to some place other than the United States. The
obsession with "Americanizing" the immigrant was the national leitmotiv that
accompanied massive immigration to the United States in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. As this immigration became one of the defining features
of national identity, fears about how to make or become "Americans" became
an obsession that often overlapped with other projects to use the making of
citizenship part of the American obsession with allegiance and loyalty. The
darkest side of this obsession began with the Chinese exclusion law in 1882
and extended through the exclusion laws of the 1920s, laws that shaped
immigration policy for a half-century. This obsession also continues in recent
programs to exclude immigrants from public services. Immigrants left their
homelands with memories of local communities, but in the United States, in
part in reaction to the Americanizers, they discovered "African," "German,"
or "Italian" (i.e., national) allegiances.
The United States was not unique in this obsession. Struggles worldwide
between centralized and decentralized centers and visions of power have led
countries to adopt some version of federalism as a workable compromise to
divide powers so residents of these countries could choose among local,
provincial, and national levels of sovereignty, indeed, transnational or
international levels for controlling their political lives. This embrace of
federalism-in nations such as Canada, Mexico, the United States, Germany,
NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP
Nigeria, Switzerland, and even Britain-reflected widespread fears of entrusting
sovereignty (and the exercise of citizenship) exclusively in nation-States.
A central conflict of Mexican history has been the challenge of persuading
or compelling people in hundreds of intensely local societies (who speak over
ninety languages) each with a tradition of controlling their lives in local
communities, to develop allegiance to and speak the official language of a
single nation-State. 16 The struggle for the nation in Mexico is the story of a
struggle, largely a record of failure, by nationalizers to impose an "imaginary
Mexico" (which included the imposition of the Spanish language) over
scattered indigenous communities with traditions of settled life reaching back
a millennium. 7 The struggle by Mexican nationalists to impose a nation-State
over disparate local communities received its classic expression in Italian
nationalist Massimo D'Azeglio's famous, if apocryphal, proclamation at the
end of Italy's unification wars: "Italy has been made; now we must make
Italians."' 8 In Italy and Mexico, as in the United States, movements by nation-
minded elites in the middle of the nineteenth century to impose national
citizenship and obedience over local movements prompted civil warfare and
were finally settled by armies loyal to the nation-State. In these struggles,
history was assigned the task of talking about the inevitability and desirability
of national triumphs-of subordinating other identities to that ofthe nation. In
many nations, including the United States, nation-States were most successful
in directing citizens' energies toward the national project in the middle third of
the twentieth century. Since then, in the generation after the 1960s, for
example, nation-States were challenged by those who would create new
nation-States in Kosovo, Serbia, Chiapas, Quebec, Palestine, Scotland,
Lombardy, East Timor, and Catalonia, or those who would redefine nationality
to include "Queer Nation," "black nationalism," or "Nation of Islam." Part of
the new literature begins with the assumption that nation-States were
"imagined" and constructed, not inevitable or desirable, that the nineteenth-
century nationalist dream that people would find fulfillment oftheir destinies
in nation-States was not natural. Inhabitants neither wanted nor imagined the
nationalists-invented communities.
16. GUILLERMO BONFIL BATALLA, MEXICO PROFUNDO: RECLAIMING A CIVILIZATION (Philip
A. Dennis trans., 1996).
17. id.; David Thelen, Mexico, the Puzzle: A Conversation about Civil Society and the Nation
with lan Semo, 86 J. AM. HIST. 689-97 (1999).
18. Recent scholars have disputed whether D'Azeglio ever made exactly this comment that for
many years scholars quoted to illustrate the difficulty of creating national loyalties. See DONNA
GABACCIA, ITALY'S MANY DIASPORAS 9 (2000).
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In imagining how people will conceive citizenship in the future, we can look
at changes in the places where they have chosen to talk and listen to each
other and the means they have used to try to shape politics. The right to vote
has been the classic means by which "Americans" act as citizens, but the
proportion of eligible voters that exercises that right has fallen from a high of
around seventy-five to seventy-nine percent in the 1880s and 1890s, to around
fifty percent in the 1990s. 9 While voting has become a less attractive way for
citizens to experience representative government, Americans over the
twentieth century have developed direct communication with
legislators-through letters and phone calls-into a major new means for
connecting themselves to the policy-making arena. As government expanded
into more areas of people's lives and became more visible through radio and
television, particularly live coverage of congressional hearings that began in
1951, the number ofcommunications to Congress rose from six to nine million
in the first Franklin Roosevelt Congress to about ninety-two and one-half
million in the first Reagan Congress. The number of communications to
Congress also rose from five percent of all Americans in 1934 to twenty-five
percent in 1981. Between 1964 and 1976, a span for which there is
comparable survey data, the proportion of Americans who reported that they
had written letters to public officials rose from seventeen percent to twenty-
eight percent while the proportion of eligible voters to cast ballots fell from
sixty-three percent to fifty-six percent. The decline in voting parallels, and
reflects a decline in, the proportion of people who place their faith in political
parties to represent them in politics. In the nineteenth century, mass-based
political parties grounded partisan division in the ethnic and religious loyalties
of U.S. citizens who were mobilized by ethnic, religious, and partisan leaders.
With the widespread decline of faith-not only in political parties and
government, but in institutions more generally-people have retreated into their
intimate face-to-face worlds as the places where they interpret and participate
in politics. Now people are more likely to compose and convey their political
beliefs to a congressperson after watching a televised hearing than to convey
their political participation by marching with other Irish Catholics or evangelical
Protestants to the polls to express their inherited ethnic, religious, and partisan
allegiances.
19. Everett CarlI Ladd, Participation in American Elections, in VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF VOTING AND VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA
109, 110-13 (Donald W. Rogers ed., 1990).
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Changes in the places where Americans seek and experience citizenship
parallel changes in the identities that they bring to citizenship. Between 1917
and 1987, Americans identified themselves very differently, in the voices they
presented in letters to congresspeople, the voices in which they wanted
congresspeople to recognize them as citizens. Over those seventy years, the
proportion of letter-writers using the smallest of all voices, that of the
individual, more than doubled from fourteen and three-fifths percent to thirty-
five and one-fifth percent. The proportion of individuals using the intimate
voice of family and friends stayed about the same, at one-third of all letter-
writers. But by far the largest change between 1917 and 1987 was the striking
decline in the number of people who projected their political conclusions to
congresspeople out of the cultures of community, occupation, ethnicity,
partisanship, gender, and religion in which nineteenth-century Americans had
forged their political identities. By 1987, the proportion of writers who
associated their conclusions with their occupations had fallen by two-thirds,
with the communities and religions by four-fifths, and with their ethnic
backgrounds by more than five-sixths."
Individual U.S. citizens reported that they increasingly felt multiple
identities as the sites where people experienced citizenship shrank from mass
parties, in which foot soldiers were mobilized into huge armies, to
conversations with family and friends; from choosing between two candidates
or parties, to the conveyance of personal experiences, needs, and opinions.
People then had to choose and combine these identities in different ways for
different circumstances in a development, which among other things, reflected
the growing tendency of people, problems, cultures, and products to cross
national lines and decenter nations. Indeed, Americans sounded less like
interchangeable pieces of larger groups and more as though they had
experienced individuality as something larger than groups or cultures. A
female individual, for example, could draw on her experiences as a woman,
lawyer, Democrat, Milwaukeean, lesbian, Italian-American, or college
graduate to shape her political views. To describe any one of these identities
alone is to fall short ofdescribing the multifaceted individual as a whole person
with multiple, overlapping, and conflicting identities. Today, as some
individuals and group leaders draw circles around poles of identity and try to
keep members from straying and strangers from entering, many people
20. On the rise of letter writing as a pattern of citizenship and the shrinking of voices in which
Americans conveyed their identities, see DAVID THELEN, BECOMING CITIZENS IN THE AGE OF
TELEVISION 8-14 (1996).
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describe themselves as "betwixt and between" poles-to use George Sanchez's
description ofMexican-American life-as border-crossers who construct their
lives between Mexican and American, Republican and Democrat, gay and
straight."
As Americans come to express their citizenship in more intimate voices
and places, we can expect them to draw ever more on a rich tradition of
people who have sought to maintain multiple identities in order to increase the
range within which they can experience life and act as citizens. In this vein,
W. E. B. DuBois has described the "double consciousness" of blacks in which
they could draw on both African and American experiences and traditions if
only Americans did not draw a color line that sought to keep the two cultures
apart. " As Anglophiles, with the outbreak of war in Europe, sought to compel
immigrants to abandon the cultures they brought to the United States, Randolph
Bourne boldly proclaimed a vision of "Trans-National America" by asserting:
America is coming to be, not a nationality but a trans-
nationality, a weaving back and forth, with other lands, of
many threads of all sizes and colors. Any movement which
attempts to thwart this weaving, to dye the fabric any one
color, or disentangle the threads of the strands, is false to this
cosmopolitan vision.23
In her brilliant Borderlands: LaFrontera, Gloria Anzaldua describes how "I,
a mestiza, continually walk out of one culture and into another, because I am
in all cultures at the same time."24 "Like others having or living in more than
one culture, we get multiple, often opposing messages,"'25 she wrote, adding
that her lesbian identity also permitted her to choose male and female
experiences. "I am an act of kneading, of uniting and joining that not only has
produced both a creature of darkness and a creature of light, but also a
creature that questions the definitions of light and dark and gives them new
21. GEORGE SANCHEZ, BECOMING MEXICAN AMERICAN: ETHNICITY, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY
IN CHICANO Los ANGELES, 1900-1945 (1993). For a recent review of the literature on making
homosexual identities see Steven Maynard, "Respect Your Elders, Know Your Past": History and
the Queer Theorists, 75 RADICAL HIST. REv. 56-78 (1999).
22. W. E. B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK: ESSAYS AND SKETCHES 3-5, 13 (Grenwich
ed., 1961) (1903).
23. RANDOLPH S. BOURNE, WAR AND THE INTELLECTUALS; ESSAYS, 1915-1919, 121 (Carl
Resek ed., 1964).
24. GLORIA ANZALDUA, BORDERLANDS: LA FRONTERA, ch. 7 (1987).
25. Id.
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meanings. A tolerance of contradictions, a tolerance for ambiguity. '2 6
Americans are abandoning single group identities, as evidenced by the
dramatic increase in interracial marriages, the most vivid example of an
intimate relationship. 2
7
The increasingly multiple, diverse, and intimate arenas within which
citizens construct hybrid and creole identities, as they imagine how to act as
citizens, corresponds and contributes to the many overlapping developments
that have decentered whatever allegiances the nation-State has been able to
command (though this is not the place to evaluate the vast and complex
literature that has emerged over the past generation to trace how nation-States
have come to look more fragile and constructed now than they did a generation
ago). However, the nation-State's capacity to govern was battered from the
Left in the 1960s and the Right in the 1990s, in slogans like "self-
determination" (that evoke people on the march) and those like "globalization"
(that seem beyond human reach).
"Globalization" seems to be coming from above in the spread across
national borders that used to contain them of institutions such as multinational
corporations, as those corporations seem increasingly to exercise some of the
traditional State forms ofsovereignty.2 Globalization also seems to be coming
from below, in new patterns that immigrants have made for themselves, as
they no longer see themselves as either Americans-in-the-making or temporary
sojourners who will return to their homelands, but as "immigrants whose daily
lives depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international
borders and whose public identities are configured in relationship to more than
one nation-State. ' 29 As migrants built institutions and cultures through which
they expressed citizenship in ways that drew pieces from, defied, and ignored,
more than one nation-State or national culture, they "destabilize[d] fixed and
unitary notions ofcommunity, culture, nationality, and, indeed, ofthe territorial
'nation' itself," said David Gutierrez, who has written about the rise of liminal
identities such as Chicano, Latino, and Hispanic-to say nothing of"people of
26. Id.
27. Gary Nash read the choice of multiple identities backward as a theme of American history
he called "The Hidden History of Mestizo America" in Gary Nash, The Hidden History of Mestizo
America, 82 J. AM. HIST. 941 (1995), ANZALUDA, supra note 24; Randolph S. Bourne, Trans-
National America, in WAR AND THE INTELLECTUALS: ESSAYS BY RANDOLPH S. BOURNE, 1915-
1919, 101(Carl Resek ed., 1964); DuBois, supra note 22, at 16-17, 23.
28. Masao Miyoshi, A Borderless World? From Colonialism to Transnationalism and the
Decline of the Nation-State, 19 CRITICAL INQUIRY 726 (1993).
29. Nina Glick Schiller et al., From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational
Migration, 68 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 48 (1995).
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color."3 As people, institutions, and popular cultures have crossed national
borders, they have carried problems ranging from sexism and AIDS to
environmental pollution with them.3
As individuals increasingly experience citizenship as a choice among
multiple histories and identities, we should not be surprised that individuals,
political activists, and national officials alike are all exploring different
transnational arenas in which people may act as citizens. In defending her
choice of the term "transnational" to define emerging patterns of citizenship,
Aiwah Ong explains:
Trans denotes both moving through space or across lines, as
well as changing the nature of something. Besides suggesting
new relations between nation-states and capital,
transnationality also alludes to the transversal, the
transactional, the translational, and the transgressive aspects
of contemporary behavior and imagination that are incited,
enabled, and regulated by the changing logics of states and
capitalism.32
The development oftransnational patterns of citizenship is clearly proceeding
more rapidly at the grass-roots level than it is among many officials and
scholars, whose faith that national citizenship is "natural," has left it hard for
them to see and map these developments. In the 1950s, Mexican officials
devoted their energies to meetings in Brazil, Argentina, and other South
American countries as they tried to construct Mexico as a Latin American
nation, but individual Mexicans constructed their lives in the United States and
forced Mexican officials to shift directions to construct Mexico as a North
American nation.3 In an era when such national patterns of citizenship (such
30. David G. Gutierrez, Migration, Emergent Ethnicity, and the "Third Space": The Shifting
Politics of Nationalism in Greater Mexico, 86 J. AM. HIST. 483 (1999).
31. I have elaborated ideas contained in this paragraph in the following two works: David
Thelen, Rethinking History and the Nation State: Mexico and the United States as a Case Study,
86 J. AM. HIST. 439 (1999); David Thelen, The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives
on United States History, 86 J.AM. HIST. 965 (1999). See also Richard Falk, The Making of Global
Citizenship, in GLOBAL VISIONS: BEYOND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 39 (Jeremy Brecher et al. eds.,
1993).
32. AIHWA ONG, FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP: THE CULTURAL LOGICS OF TRANSNATIONALITY 4
(1999).
33. David Thelen, Mexico, the Latin North American Nation: A Conversation with Carlos Rico
Ferrat, 86 J. AM. HIST. 467 (1999).
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as writing congresspeople) have increasingly centered around intimate
relationships, it is not surprising that many citizens build these new non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) through relationships with other activists
and colleagues that cross national borders. Reflecting this growing
transnational activity, the number ofNGOs dedicated to human rights has risen
from thirty-three in 1953, to seventy-nine by 1983, and 168 in 1993; to women's
rights, from ten in 1953, to twenty-five in 1983, and sixty-one in 1993; and to
environmental protection, from two in 1953, to twenty-six in 1983, and ninety
in 1993. In more than forty U.S. communities in the 1980s, activists formed
close connections with like-minded groups of(primarily) Sandinistas in sister
Nicaraguan cities. Those connections carried everything from love, to material
aid and political empowerment. Personal relations among people in sister
communities-who knew each other as members of two extended families,
grieved over deaths and natural disasters, rejoiced in births and marriages,
exchanged photographs and gifts, and stayed in each others' homes-prefigured
a future citizenship. In this emerging citizenship, individuals could control their
lives across national borders and create far-reaching political changes even
when their governments were at war. For example, when the U.S.
government was using legal and illegal means to destroy the Sandinista
movement and government in Nicaragua, activists made a common cause
across national lines to challenge their States.34
As people increasingly lived their lives in circuits that looped between two
or more countries, they demanded the right to take part as citizens in both
countries-to be able to draw on the pasts of both countries to shape their
futures. Officials in both countries likewise needed them. One result was the
emergence ofa human rights movement which envisioned rights not as things
given by nation-States, but as things people carried with them by virtue of their
simple humanity; as rights that should accompany them as they crossed
national borders.35 As Mexico and the United States collaborated to maintain
surveillance over their citizens, as Mexican politicians increasingly campaigned
in the United States for state and local office in Mexico, and as champions of
democracy in Mexico increasingly depended on American activists to monitor
their State, movements for democracy, human rights, and citizenship burst
34. MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 4, 7, 11 (1998); LIZ CHILSEN & SHELDON RAMPTON,
FRIENDS IN DEED: THE STORY OF US-NICARAGUAN SISTER CITIES (1988).
35. YASEMIN NUHOGLU SOYSAL, LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL
MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE (1994).
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across national borders and became transnational struggles. By the late 1990s,
Mexico had formally abandoned its traditional position that emigrants lost their
Mexican citizenship when they left their homeland and began to take steps
toward embracing formal dual citizenship in which migrants could take part in
both Mexican and American elections. Mexico thereby fulfilled the dream of
many borderlands champions and embraced the idea that multiple citizenships
offered a wider range of citizen life than single citizenship did.36
Once transnational movements became obvious in the present, scholars
began to discover that earlier movements for abolition of slavery, temperance,
women's and workers' rights, Socialism, peace, revolution, and democracy,
had also been transnational (though invisible) to nation-minded scholars and
politicians. These dramatic changes on the ground have also brought many
national histories into dialogue with the result of challenging the older
confidence that each nation experienced the past differently. As previously-
isolated histories collide, we are discovering and imagining pasts that
emphasize common patterns-not different ones-between nations, common
problems addressed, and common issues and solutions to learn from, and thus
more alternatives to explore. 7 We will discover that the history of the Estados
Unidos Mexicanos, like that of the United States of America, includes stories
of a nation's birth in revolution against a European empire that had "settled"
its territory as colonial outposts to advance commercial and religious agendas;
of a moving frontier engagement with unfamiliar forms of nature, other
empires, and Indian tribes; of massive nineteenth-century constitutional debates
and ultimately civil warfare over whether power should be in local or national
hands; of victory by forces of nationalism; of turn-of-the-century revolts to
redistribute power from the privileged to the people; of a popular president in
the 1930s who established a security net; of movements for democratization
and empowerment that flowered in the 1960s; of aNew Right movement and
its president in the 1980s that deregulated the economy and promoted free
trade; and finally, in the 1990s, ofa far-reaching debate about national identity,
about whether the nation's construction of itself as a melting pot continues to
describe the national culture of its people. When history explores common
36. See MICHAEL JONES-CORREA, BETWEEN Two NATIONS: THE POLITICAL PREDICAMENT
OF LATINOS IN NEW YORK CITY (1998); SOYSAL, supra note 35; LATINO CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP:
CLAIMING IDENTITY, SPACE, AND RIGHTS (William V. Flores & Rina Benmayor eds., 1997);
ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG ET AL., ESCAPE FROM VIOLENCE: CONFLICT AND THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD (1989); Thelen, supra note 34.
37. See Michael Geyer & Charles Bright, World History in a Global Age, 100 AM. HIST. REV.
1034 (1995).
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patterns in different countries it will be a discipline better able to address
Bosniak's article.
In order to imagine future directions for citizenship, we should look beyond
the formal or legal right to citizenship to the wide fields of struggle that have
marked its history. "Citizen of the world" will connote as many contradictory
and contested meanings as "citizen of the United States." There was nothing
natural about embedding civic aspiration in national citizenship and there will
be nothing natural in world citizenship. Some people will favor and experience
it as a means for some kind of empowerment, while others will resent giving
up traditional controls to a larger and more remote public identity. In any case,
the extension will be accompanied by the same conflict, multiplicity,
ambivalence, and struggle that accompanied the history of national citizenship.
At this moment of declining trust in national institutions we can expect
Americans, as in the past, to develop and strengthen multiple vehicles and
arenas on several geographic levels for acting as citizens.

